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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
ST.ATE O.F UTAH 
ALFRED ROGER MOORE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE 
vVESTERN RAILROAD CO~IP ANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8284 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
and 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
COMES NOW Alfred Roger Moore, respondent here-
in, and respectfully petitions this IIonorable Court for 
a rehearing in the above-entitled case and to vacate the 
Order of the Court herein reversing thP judgment for 
respondent. 
This petition is based on the following grounds: 
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Point I. 
This Court erred in holding that the jury should have 
been instructed that they were not to take into considera-
tion .any evidence regarding a ruptured disc. 
Point II. 
The Court erred in ruling that the trial court was in 
error when it gave its Instruction No. 12 to the effect 
that the statutes of the State of Utah and Colorado cover .. 
ing Employers' Liability and vV orkman's Compensation 
are not applicable and that plaintiff's right to recover is 
based solely upon the statutes of the United States. 
Point III. 
The Court erred in ruling that the trial court was in 
error in giving its Instruction No. 13 to the effect that 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act an employee 
should not be held to have assumed the risks of his em-
ployment in any case where his injury resulted in whole 
or in p.art from defendant's negligence. 
Point I\7 • 
The concurring judges erred in holding that the 
verdict was excessive indicating bias and prejudice on the 
part of the jurors. 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
Counsel for Respondent 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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I hereby certify that I am one of the attorneys for the 
respondent, petitioner herein, and that in my opinion 
there is good cause to believe the judgment objected to 
is erroneous and that the case ought to be re-examined 
as prayed for in said petition. 
DATED March 31st, 1956. 
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I. 
THIS COUR.T ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE JURY 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT :THEY WERE 
NOT TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ANY EVIDENCE 
REGARDING A RUPTURED DISC. 
The opinion herein confuses a number of proposi-
tions. In the first place, the injury from which plaintiff 
suffers was definitely established by the opinion of the 
doctor. lie testified that in his opinion plaintiff was 
suffering from nerve root irritation as follows (R. 61): 
"* * * it was my opinion th.at 1\Ir. Moore had 
irritation of the nerves of the lower spine, which 
radiate into both legs, especially on the left side." 
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He was asked about the causal relation between the 
dropping of the tire and the nerve root injury. He testi-
fied that it was possible that the dropping of the tire 
caused the nerve root injury. This established that medi-
cally there could be .a causal relation between the two. 
At this point the claimant in Chief Consolidated Mining 
Co. v. Salisb1JJry, 61 Utah 66, 210 Pac. 929, stopped. How-
ever, in the case at bar, as in Utah Fuel Co. v. Industria~ 
Commission, 102 Utah 26, 126 P. 2d 1070, plaintiff pro-
ceeded with further evidence. In both cases plaintiff and 
claimant proved there was no symptom before the 
trauma. From the trauma to the time of trial in the case 
at bar, and to the time of death in the Utah Fuel case, 
the plaintiff and deceased had suffered pain and disa-
bility. According to the Utah Fuel case, this was suffi-
cient to make a jury case on causal relation. 
It was on this very basis that the court in the Utah 
Fuel case distinguished the Salisbury case. In discussing 
this latter case, the court stated (p. 30) : 
"* * * The case of Chief Consolidated Mining 
Co. v. Salisbury, 61 Utah 66, 210 P. 929, 930, is not 
necessarily in conflict 'vith this view. While the 
decision does not state what the nature of the acci-
dent was 'vhich it was clai1ned accelerated a 
chronic disease of the heart, the record reveals 
that it was a definite event, to wit, a slipping and 
wrenching of the muscles of his right side and 
a bruising and straining of the muscles of his right 
chest wall in trying to stop the fall. The opinion 
states that there was 'no positive statement that in 
the judgment of the experts testifying it did or 
could have (accelerated the heart disease).' " 
* * * * 
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"* * * This court in that case went on to say 
'nor is there any fact proven from which it might 
legally or reasonably be deducted that the acci-
dent did accelerate the disease.' 
"In this case there are such facts. The speci-
fie member was injured and from that time on 
grew progressively vvorse until death." 
It is the Utah Fuel case which is similar to the case 
at bar .and not the Salisbury case as stated in the opinion. 
The case at bar is stronger than the Utah Fuel case be-
cause the doctor there said that he would not even specu-
late whether the injury accelerated the pre-existing can-
cerous condition and this court paraphrased his testimony 
as follows (p. 29): 
"* * * The medical profession has been un-
able definitely to determine the cause and cure of 
cancer. The profession is hesitant to make any 
positive statements concerning it." 
This is very similar to Dr. Clegg's testimony (R. 64): 
"A. In medicine, we cannot come out definitely on 
things, very often and say absolutely definite-
ly that such-and-such a condition is so-and-so, 
but vve usually qualify our diagnosis, because 
sometimes we get fooled, and we use the word 
'possible' and that is all I can state. I cannot 
say definitely that this is probably or defin-
itely that it is. It is just a possible condition; 
that was my opinion." 
What was the specific internal condition which 
caused plaintiff's nerve root irritation~ No cause or 
condition other than a ruptured disc vvas suggested by 
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anyone. No one could see inside the body of plaintiff 
and so anything suggested would not be a certainty. 
Just as Dr. Clegg said, if he could not be definite he 
could only say it was a possibility. Everything here was 
consistent with the existence of a disc. This is not a c.ase 
where there are two possible causes and which is the 
cause cannot be determined. Here there was a possibility 
of one cause and so far as the record is concerned, no 
other. 
The situation here is analygous to that encountered 
in Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper 
Co., 282 1J.S. 555, 51 S. Ct. 248, 75 L. Ed. 544 (1930) where 
it is held a judgment should be affirmed 'vhen the fact 
of damage is certain but there is uncertainty as to the 
extent. The court stated the rule as follows: 
"Nor can we accept the view of that court 
that the verdict of the jury, in so far as it in-
cluded damages for the first item, cannot stand 
because it was based upon mere speculation and 
conjecture. This characterization of the basis for 
the verdict is unwarranted. It is true that there 
was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage, but 
there w.as none as to the fact of damage ; and there 
is a clear distinction between the measure of proof 
necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had 
sustained some damage and the measure of proof 
necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount. 
The rule which precludes the recovery of uncer-
tain damages applies to such as are not the cer-
tain result of the wrong, not to those damages 
which are definitely attributable to the wrong and 
only uncertain in respect of their amount. * * *" 
• =It: :t • 
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"As was said by Judge Anderson in his dis-
senting opinion below, there are many cases in 
which damages are allowed where the element of 
uncertainty is at least equal to that in the present 
case - as, for example, copyright and trade-mark 
cases, cases of unfair competition and many cases 
of personal injury. * * *" 
In the case at bar there can be no question that plain-
tiff suffered injury as a result of the falling of the tire 
and \vheel. Hence, damage is certain and only its extent 
uncertain when we construe the evidence as does the 
majority of this court . 
.. A .. pparently the majority opinion holds that causal 
relation is not a jury question. They cite the Utah Fuel 
case to support a statement that evidence of possibility 
of cause is .admissible. They fail to consider this case on 
the question of sufficiency. The case is not one of ad-
missibility but is one of sufficiency of evidence. The 
majority relies upon the Salisbury case. However, a 
careful reading of the Utah Fuel case shows that the 
court distinguished the Salisbury case and refused to 
follow it because of the existence of evidence, which is 
present in the case at b.ar. The evidence here is that 
plaintiff vvas in good health before the injury and had 
never had any trouble with his back. From the time of 
injury he has constantly been troubled with his back. 
We also submit that this Court has "slavishly" fol-
lowed the witness' choice of words. It has seized upon 
the word "possible", taken it out of context and applied 
a strict construction to its meaning. The doctor could 
not be absolutely sure of the exact condition existing in-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
side of plaintiff's body. He could not see inside. He 
therefore used the word possible. In so many words, he 
stated that he used the word not in its ordinary connota-
tion but as creating a concept that if a thing was not 
absolutely certain then the only term to be used is pos-
sible. That is not the usual meaning of the word but the 
witness chose "possible" and explained the meaning he 
attached to it. See Dr. Clegg's testimony quoted supra. 
The opinion on this point flies in the face and is con-
trary to the language of the United States Supreme 
Court in Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 
90 L. Ed. 916, quoted on page 30 of Respondent's 
Brief herein. Of necessity there must be some speculation 
in arriving at a conclusion regarding the inner workings 
of the human body. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING 'THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS IN ERROR WHEN IT GAVE ITS INSTRUCTION 
. NO. 12 TO THE EFFECT 'THAT 'THE STATUTES OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH AND COLORADO COVERING EMPLOY-
ERS' LIABILITY AND WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION ARE 
NOT APPLI·CABLE AND THAT PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO 
RECOVER IS BASED SOLELY UPON THE STATUTES OF 
THE UNITED STA'TES. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS IN ERROR IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 
13 TO THE EFFECT THAT UNDER THE FEDERAL EM-
PLOYERS' LIABILI'TY ACT AN EMPLOYEE SHOULD NOT 
BE HELD TO HAVE ASSUMED THE RISKS OF HIS EM-
PLOYMENT IN ANY CASE WHERE HIS INJURY RESULT-
ED IN WHOLE OR IN PART FROM DEFENDAN·T'S NEGLI-
GEN,CE. 
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Points II and III can be considered together since 
they involve the same principle. 
For at le.ast a dozen years and by 1nany trial judges 
instructions similar or exactly like Instruction Nos. 
12 and 13 have been given in F.E.L.A. cases. These trial 
judges have been of the opinion that they serve a useful 
purpose in keeping the minds of the jury in the proper 
channel in deciding the case and to keep jurors from con-
sidering things which should not influence their verdict. 
""\Vhy should not the jury know what the law is on 
propositions which might cause it to go astray~ These 
are not instructions on extr.aneous issues but rather are 
they cautionary instructions to guard against erroneous 
i1npressions jurors probably have. 
This Court gives one reason for not g1v1ng these 
instructions as follows: 
"* * * It is obvious that an attempt to exclude 
all possible considerations from the individual 
thinking of the jurors which may influence the 
verdict would be an impossible task .and result in 
instructions so numerous that the only result could 
be complete confusion. * * *" 
The simple and obvious ansv1er to this is that the 
Court can \Vait until the instructions are so numerous 
as to result in complete confusion and then reverse or 
hold them improper. In the case at bar, this situation 
does not exist. Two instructions can hardly be said to be 
numerous or to result in confusion of any kind. 
Two instructions were requested by plaintiff whereby 
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the jury would be informed correctly of the law, an erron-
eous impression of which might cause an erroneous result 
in the verdict. The trial judge, in his discretion, believed 
it proper to inform the jury. The Court now says it was 
improper. Upon what grounds~ Extraneous issues and 
confusion! 
We do hope that this striking down of long given 
cautionary or extraneous instructions will not be one 
sided and only relate to those instructions which aid 
plaintiffs in preventing juries from falling into error. 
Similar instructions have been given at the behest 
of defendants in F.E.L.A. cases for many years by many 
trial judges and even in the case at bar. The jury is usu-
ally told that syn1pathy should play no part in the trial 
of a lawsuit and .a railroad corporation should be treated 
the same as an individual. No one ever contends differ-
ently. Such instruction covers no issue in the la\vsuit, 
but judges have believed this instruction helpful in keep-
ing the "eye" of the jury "on the ball." But certainly 
it falls within the principle of the Moore case and hence 
should not be given. 
Another defendant's instruction uniformly given is 
one that informs the jury that defendant railro.ad com-
panies are not insurers of the safety of their employees 
and that there is no liability for accidents. No one ever 
contends to the contrary and such are never issues in the 
case. As the instructions herein struck down, these in-
structions are helpful to keep juries in the right chan-
nels. These instructions n1ay no longer be given, at le.ast 
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if this Court applies with even handed justice the doctrine 
novv espoused. 'Vhat is taken from plaintiffs should also 
be taken from defendants. Other examples could be given 
but this should be sufficient to show the error of this opin-
Ion. 
A peculiar thing about this opinion is that the trial 
court is told not to give these instructions in a retrial 
but so far as we re.ad the opinion, it nowhere holds the 
giving of these instructions to be prejudicial or reversible 
error. This is a new role for an appellate court. 
The federal law is controlling. Dice v. Akron, Can-
ton & Y o~tngstown R. Co., 342 lJ.S. 359, 72 S. Ct. 312. 
Only one federal case was cited in the briefs herein. 
It held an instruction that an employee did not assume 
the risk of the negligence of his employer was proper 
in an F.E.L.A. c.ase. This authority was· ignored and not 
even referred to. See Atlantic Coast LineR. Co. v. Burk-
ett, 192 F. 2d 941 (5 C.C.A. 1951). Other cases were cited 
upholding this instruction. This Court, when the matter 
was squarely raised, refused to hold the giving of this 
instruction improper. Brttner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 
399, 142 P. 2d 649 (1943). This latter case held similarly 
on the instruction advising that workmen's compensation 
laws were inapplicable. 
The only .authorities cited by the Court are the 
Bruner case (which is contrary to the present holding), 
Parker v. Bamberger, 100 Utah 361, 116 P. 2d 425, and 
Ellis v. Union Pacific R. Co., 148 Neb. 515, 27 N.W. 2d 
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921. The Parker case does not consider an instruction 
like either of the two here and in fact held the instruc-
tion advising under what circun1stances the driver would 
be negligent was properly given. In the Ellis caie, the 
court shows a complete misunderstanding of the statu-
tory elimination of assumption of risk. It states that 
the statutory elimination only applied to it as a defense 
and not as an element in determining nonnegligence of 
defendant. In Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 
U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610, the court expressly 
refused to follow any such concept and ruled every vestige 
of that doctrine to have been abolished. It stated: 
"* * * We hold that every vestige of the doc-
trine of assumption of risk was obliterated from 
the .law by the 1939 amendment, and that Con-
gress, by abolishing the defense of assumption of 
risk in that statute, did not mean to leave open 
the identical defense for the master by changing 
its name to 'non-negligence.' * * *" 
We submit that this Court has held contrary to all 
credible authorities, contrary to its own position hereto-
fore announced in the Bruner case and contrary to the 
almost uniform practice of many trial judges for many 
years in this jurisdiction. We submit such a holding is 
absolutely erroneous and improper and before such 
a right about face is perpetrated a rehearing should be 
granted. The holding in this case has caused confusion 
in the minds of the trial judges faced with the problem 
of properly instructing juries and keeping their delibera-
tions within proper bounds. 
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POINT IV. 
THE CO:NCURRING JUDGES ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE INDICATING BIAS 
AND PREJUDICE ON 1THE PART OF 'THE JURORS. 
Two justices held that a new trial should be granted 
upon the grounds that the verdict appears to have been 
rendered as a result of passion and prejudice. The other 
three justices say nothing on this proposition. It there-
fore see1ns necessary to address ourselves to this. 
vVe submit this holding is erroneous. It seems a bit 
difficult to believe the jury w.as influenced by passion 
and prejudice vvhen it cut the verdict fifty percent. This 
is a strange thing for an inflamed group of citizens to 
do. They are inflamed against defendant when they cut 
the verdict in half in favor of defendant~ 
This opinion also hypothesizes that the passion and 
prejudice was engendered by taking pictures of plaintiff. 
This .act was performed by defendant and introduced 
by defendant. How many more times must we try this 
already twice tried case confronted each time by this 
same testimony. It seems neither right nor just to infer 
prejudice and passion from an act of a defendant which 
itself introduces. As well grant a new trial where a 
defense counsel states an insur.ance company is involved. 
This minority opinion does not view the evidence 
favorable to plaintiff's case. Plaintiff did not take a leave 
of absence to put up his hay, he testified. He went to kill 
an elk to feed his family once. He~ taught, once, kids to 
box; he danced once ; he entered a calf roping contest 
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once. He tried not ag.ain because of his back. 
The jury was instructed that the amount prayed for 
was not material and correctly so. It is of no help here 
that the jury found the damages asked were right. The 
figures set forth at page 62 of Respondent's Brief are 
reasonable, were reasonably arrived at and are justified 
by the evidence. 
We submit the verdict was not attributable to passion 
or prejudice. The trial judge with his facilities of ex-
perience, seeing and hearing plaintiff and other witnesses 
did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's mo-
tion for a new trial. 
In Respondent's Brief is found a complete statement 
of the evidence most f.avorable to plaintiff. We will not 
again review this evidence. The foregoing considerations 
should . eliminate the existence of any passion. If there 
is any excessiveness in the verdict this Court can require 
a remittitur and prevent the requirement of another and 
third trial. 
CONCLUSION 
We re·spectfully pray that the Court grant a rehear-
ing or affirm or consider the matter of ren1ittitur. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS 
Co1tnsel for Respondent 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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